General Hatch's attempt to reorganize the Corps of Engineers--the world's largest construction agency-is a useful case study because it involved an institution with both an important role in national defense and an important domestic responsibility with political implications. This paper examines the case for reorganization of the Corps of Engineers, the players in the decision-making process, the process itself, and its outcome.
THE CASE FOR REORGANIZATION
The United States Army Corps of Engineers is a unique organization.
leadership is made up employees are civilians.
While its of uniformed Army officers, the vast majority of its 43,000
With an average annual working budget of $10 billion it serves as the construction agent for the Army and Air Force as well as having respponsibility for the design, construction, and operation of national water-related structures.
Additional missions include environmental protection and restoration, disaster response, research and development, and reimbursable assistance to other nations. With more than 900 work stations spread across the contiguous 48 states it is both a national and a local agency. Its large budget, regulatory functions, and local presence make it a direct conduit from Washington to congressional districts for dollars, jobs, and influence. As
General Colin Powell said in a recent appearance before the National Defense University, "All politics are local. ,2__ and it is this local aspect of the Corps of Engineers that gives it such a high profile in Congress.
The unusual civil works responsibility of the Corps dates to the early 19th century The fact that the proposed reorganization plan was held until after the elections and released on November 15, 1992 demonstrates yet again the extent to which political considerations played in the process.
CONCLUSION
General Hatch was not politically naive. His optimism on the success of the BRAC process was surely based both on his sincere desire to shape a more efficient organization and on his years of experience in Washington where virtually nothing with political consequences happens by accident. Drafters of legislation are masters at avoiding the pitfalls of ambiguous language unless they intend for it to be ambiguous.
The entire structure of the BRAC process was an admission by Congress that it could not bring itself to act in an objective and unbiased manner on the base closure issue. There was no reason to believe that it would not take the same approach with the recognized need of the Corps of Engineers to streamline its activities. It is both interesting and ironic that the rational process and the bureaucratic political process produced essentially the same result in terms of manpower and cost reductions.
The real lesson here is not that rational decisions cannot emerge from the political process, but rather that no matter how correct a proposed action seems, the political consequences must be carefully addressed as the decision-making process unfolds.
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